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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KEN MERENA, an individual, and dba
MERENA INVESTMENTS,
CaseNo.20110377-CA

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALICE M. MERENA,
Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION BECAUSE A FINAL ORDER
WAS ENTERED
As this Court stated:
For an order to be a final, appealable order, the order must dispose of all parties or
claims to an action. Where further action is contemplated by the express language
of the order, the order is not a final, appealable order. The district court must also
determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees, if any, before the judgment
becomes final for the purposes of an appeal.

Wierzbicki v. Heart, 2010 UT App 146, 20100319-CA (UTCA)(internal citations and
quotations omitted); see also addendum A. In a similar case where there was a dispute

1
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whether a district court's ruling was final and appealable, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
On the basis of [the] language, as well as the fact that a final order was
subsequently entered, it seems obvious that neither the parties nor the court
regarded it as a final judgment, otherwise there would have been no purpose in
entering the final order.
Swenson Associates Architects, P.C. v. State By and Through Div. of Facilities Const.,
889 P.2d 415,417 (Utah 1994)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
In this case, it is clear based upon its language and the parties agreement that the
November 20, 2009, Ruling and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Sanctions Against
Ken Merena-one of the orders that Mr. Merena is appealing-is not a final and appealable
order.
The Appellee further argues that the April 8, 2011, Final Order and Judgment, is
not a final and appealable order. Yet the Final Order and Judgment expressly states that it
is the "final judgment" of the district court and it specifically lists the attorney's fees,
fines, and costs that Mr. Merena is ordered to pay to the Appellee and to the court. See
TR 2994-2994A. It also is final because it does not require any further action from the
parties. See Wierzbicki v. Heart, 2010 UT App 146, 20100319-CA (UTCA); addendum
A.
II.

MR. MERENA EITHER PRESERVED THE ISSUES FOR APPEAL. AN
EXCEPTION APPLIES. OR THE ISSUES DID NOT NEED TO BE
EXPRESSLY PRESERVED BECAUSE MR. MERENA IS APPEALING
DISTRICT COURT ORDERS & JUDGMENTS
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a), states that a party has the right

2
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to appeal any district court's final orders and judgments by filing a notice of appeal in the
trial court within the appellate deadlines. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The Appellee argues
that Mr. Merena's "brief is woefully silent as to how or when [his first two appellate
issues] were preserved for appeal." Brief of Appellee at pg. 22. This, however, is not the
case.
A party needs to preserve an issue for appeal if it involves what he or she believes
to be the district court's misapplication of court rules, such as the Utah Rules of
Evidence, etc. However, if both parties present evidence and argument at an evidentiary
hearing, via dispositive motions or at a final trial, then the district court's orders and
judgments issued thereafter do not require an additional pleading to preserve a party's
right to appeal any such order or judgment. The very nature of the process preserves such
issues for appeal. If this were not the case, parties would be required to file a postjudgment objection to every judgment or order resulting from a motion, oral argument or
trial.
Moreover, as Apellee stated in her brief, "when rulings and orders have gone
against [Mr. Merena], he has filed motions to reconsider or to alter or amend the court's
rulings" such as Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling and Order Dated May 11,
2009 or Final Order re: Dismissal of Specified Claims. Appellee Brief at pg. 23; see also
TR 1758-1812. In this appeal, the first appellate issue concerns the district court's Ruling
and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Sanctions Against Ken Merena. See Appellant
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i

Brief at pg. 7; TR 2498-2505. The second appellate issue concerns three of the District
Court's orders: (1) Order Re: Defendant's 2nd Verified Application for Attorney Fees; (2)

*

Contempt Hearing Decision Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; and (3)
Judgment Re: Contempt Order Costs and Attorney Fees. See TR 2692-2695, 2842-2851.
Therefore these issues by their presentation have been preserved.
Admittedly, it is true that Mr. Merena didn't preserve his third appellate issue for
(

appeal, but as stated in more detail in his Brief, the exceptional circumstances, plain error,
and liberty interest exceptions apply which allows the Court to review the third issue on
appeal. See Brief of Appellant at pg 32; State v. Weaver, 122 P.3d 566, 570 (Utah 2005);

(

State v. Adams, 2011 UT App 163, 20090793-CA (UTCA); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,
853 (Utah 1992); addendum B.
(

III.

DISMISSAL IS A LAST RESORT
The parties and the courts agree that dismissal of a case is a sanction of last resort.

See Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452,456 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Arnica Mut. Ins.

i

Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Appellee argues that the district
court's dismissal of Mr. Merena's case was justified as a "last resort" because the district

(

court had already sanctioned Mr. Merena previously for "improper, abusive written
discovery tactics." In support thereof, the Appellee invites the Court, in its many duties to
i

peruse 326 pages of the trial record. See Brief of Appellee at pg. 24; TR 938-952 & 24762788. Due to her improper, imprecise and patently over broad citation, Appellant's
i
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counsels, who have reviewed the trial record, are at a loss to identify what exactly the
Appellee is referring to in support of her argument.
Therefore, in the Appellee's own words, it is not this court nor Mr. Merena's
"obligation to ferret through the record" in order to know what evidence she is referring
to and, "this court [should] not consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by,
the record." See Brief of Appellee at pg. 23; Garner State v. Garner, 52 P.3d 467, 470
(Utah App. 2002)(quoting Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah Q.App.1995)).
Consequently, ft[i]nasmuch as [appellee] has failed to properly brief this argument, [this
court should] decline to address its merits." Walker v. U.S.General, Inc., 916 P.2d 903,
908 (Utah 1996).
Nevertheless, prior to the district court's dismissal of Mr. Merena's case on
November 20, 2009, the district court entered monetary sanctions against Mr. Merena. It
did so, due to discovery related issues, on February 19, 2009, in the amount of $717.50
while Mr. Merena was still represented by counsel. See TR 2476-2478. Then, it did so
again, on May 11, 2009, in the amount of $260.00 when Mr. Merena, as a pro se litigant,
deposed the Appellee's previous attorney. See TR 938-952 & 1377-1381. All told these
sanctions, as acknowledged by Appellee as a "fairly nominal amount," totaled $977.50.
It was only then, on November 20, 2009, that the District Court dismissed
Appellant's case and imposed an additional $3,271.35 in monetary sanctions against Mr.
Merena. See TR 2667-2668. Appellee asserts that since the trial court had previously

5
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i

imposed the "fairly nominal amount," of $977.50, that the dismissal-the sanction of "last
resort"-was inevitable and therefore unassailable.

*

Yet, is this not a significant upping of the ante? Moving, as Appellee stated, from a
"fairly nominal," sanction to dismissal and the imposition of an additional $3,271.35 in

.

monetary sanctions at a time when Mr. Merena was a pro se litigant. See TR 2692-2695.
Appellant would submit that in light of this, dismissal was not implemented as a last
{

resort, nor was this, "a graduated scale of sanctions." See Appellee Brief at pg. 15. The
additional $3,271.35 in monetary sanctions was a much more severe sanction than the
"fairly nominal" amount the district court had previously entered against him.

I

Additionally, before this sanction of "last resort" was imposed, the district court may have
also required Mr. Merena to reimburse each deponent for their time, required him to
engage counsel before proceeding further with his case, or required the filing of a cost
bond, etc.
In any event, dismissal of a cause of action is too seductive and convenient a
remedy for the trial court to impose without it truly being the remedy of last resort-to be
employed only when other remedial measures would be wholly inadequate. While Mr.

<

Merena's actions merit censure, there were mitigating circumstances and other less
drastic remedies available to the district court. It was therefore an abuse of discretion for
i

the district court to dismiss Mr. Merena's case, which the Court should accordingly
vacate.
6
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A.

Sanctions Should be Based on the Facts and Law Applicable in Each Particular
Case and Not on the Facts and Applicable Law in Other Cases
Appellee has also quoted conclusory statements made by adjudicators about Mr.

Merena's behavior in other litigation between the parties and has mischaracterized
Appellant's current circumstances. Appellant's counsels submit that if Appellee were
required to cite the facts that were found by these other courts in support of their
conclusory statements and were required to indicate what remedies were requested therein
and declined, their impact would be significantly diminished for several reasons.
First, they would show that these statements reflect more on Mr. Merena's
behavior and tactics than upon the substance of his legal claims. Second, Appellant
submits that he is the recipient of cultural and societal norms in which it is frowned upon,
even when there are legitimate basis for doing so, for a litigant to challenge a bankruptcy
and especially for a male litigant to take legal action against a verbally irresponsible and
verbally violent estranged spouse-most believe such behavior should just be tolerated.
Third, any sanctions and penalties requested by Appellee in those other cases have been
either imposed or were denied and therein remedied the Appellant's alleged misdeeds and
are therefore irrelevant. Last, as heretofore argued, many of Mr. Merena's misdeeds were
due to his mis-perception and naivety regarding the rules of procedure and evidence.
In conclusion, the other cases mentioned by the Appellee-while they may involve
the same parties-do not apply in the current case and they should be accordingly
disregarded by the Court. Furthermore, the Apellee has not provided sufficient
7
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information thereon for such facts to bear upon a resolution of the issues in this case.
B.

(

Mr. Merena is Not an Attorney
Appellee also argues that the district court's dismissal of Mr. Merena's case was

warranted because Mr. Merena has been involved in other lawsuits. Mr. Merena,
however, is not an attorney, has not been habitually pro se1, nor is he a, "professional
litigant." Mr. Merena has not gone to law school nor has he passed any state bar exam,
including the Utah state bar exam. For this reason when Mr. Merena acted as a pro se
litigant in the current case he misunderstood the rules of evidence, other rules, and district
court orders related to discovery which contributed to his judgment which precipitated the

(

sanctions.
C.

Mr. Merena Does Have the Right to Legal Counsel
i
In her opening, and throughout her argument, rather then address the law and facts

supporting her position, Appellee has indirectly attacked Mr. Merena's counsels for their,
"active aid and assistance," in an alleged ongoing campaign to, "harass Davis, strangle
her with litigation, and destroy her financially." See Brief of Appellee at pgs. 3, 8, & 13.
What is lost from these characterizations is, what in most cases is understood by the legal

^

profession, that there is another story here.
For what it is worth, it was Appellee, who after a very short marriage of 14 months
I
*In fact Mr. Merena has not heretofore been a pro se litigant, and in the case cited by
Appellee, he was the defendant and he prevailed.
<
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to the Appellant in which Mr. Merena funded her education and fully supported her and
her children, filed for a divorce requesting a substantial property settlement and alimony
award. For example, the parties did not acquire any real property during the marriage, but
the Appellee petitioned the Court for the appreciation in value in the Appellant's
premarital home, that he pay "bridge alimony," that he pay all the marital debts, for the
Appellee's medical procedure, and her attorney's fees. See addendum C. The Appellant
subsequently filed and was granted an annulment. See TR 2498-2505. Furthermore, it
should be understood that immediately prior to the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Merena's
only remaining cause of action, that cause of action was solely for injunctive relief from
Apellee's persistent campaign to defame Mr. Merena's reputation. See TR 2486-2487.
Appellee could have easily ended any alleged, "campaign to destroy her financially," by
agreeing to refrain from defaming Mr. Merena. In fact, Mr. Merena had even offered to
settle his defamation lawsuits for an agreement that the Appellee would cease engaging in
defamatory behavior. See TR 2494-2497. If Appellee had accepted Mr. Merena's
proposal, then she would have saved both the parties thousands of dollars in attorney's
fees and costs.
Furthermore, rather than accept the Appellant's Rule 68 Offer or agree to the
imposition of an injunction, to curry favor from the district court and play up her status as
a victim, Appellee even represented to the district court that she, "already agree[d] to,"
obey the law and refrain from, "engaging] in libel or slander against the," Appellant and

9
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(

that the, "Court [could] tell her to obey the law." See TR 1864-1870.
Lastly, without justifying the means and tactics that were employed by Mr. Merena

{

or any prior counsel, as officers of the court, Mr. Merena's current counsels, who have
endeavored to steer clear of any opprobrious behavior and have not been involved in any
prior sanctionable conduct, would indicate that they have evaluated Mr. Merena's claims,
found them to be substantially meritorious and currently assert, although this court may
ultimately disagree with their arguments, that this appeal is filed in good faith. The trial
court itself actually stated his claims were, "seemingly meritorious." See TR 2498-2505.
In short, even though this is a civil case, the sanctions imposed are similar to

i

criminal penalties imposed in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, as founding father John
Adams said, "Counsel is the last thing an accused person should lack in a free country."
IV.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CONTEMPT HEARINGS IS ON THE
DEFENDANT
Appellee argues that because Mr. Merena was not present at the civil contempt

hearing "he made no incriminating statement at the hearing, and the burden of proof
never shifted to him to do anything at the hearing." See Appellee of Brief at pg. 28. This,
however, is not the case. For an order to show cause to be issued by the court, the moving
party has to merely make a prima facie showing that the alleged disobedient party has not
complied with the district court's orders. See Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1157
(Utah 1983). After the court issues the order to show cause, the burden shifts to the
receiving party to bear or lose by default. See id. Hence, Mr. Merena had the burden of
10
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<

proof
Given that contempt proceedings allow for the imposition of criminal penalties
such as a loss of liberty, Mr. Merena submits that he should have been afforded the
protections and rights given to criminal defendants-including the right against selfincrimination-and the law should accordingly be changed so the burden of proof is placed
on the moving party in contempt proceedings and not on the opponent thereof.
To the contrary, if the burden of proof was not on Mr. Merena at the order to show
cause hearing, the Appellee would have been required to show that Mr. Merena (1) knew
what the district court required of him, (2) that he had the ability to comply with the
district court's order-i.e. he could pay the monetary sanctions by the district court's
deadlines-and, (3) that he willfully and intentionally refused to comply with the district
court's orders. The Appellee did not provide evidence at the order to show cause hearing
to fulfill all of the above elements for sanctions to be granted, and as the district court
found, there was not any evidence provided regarding Mr. Merena's ability to pay the
monetary sanctions that had been entered against him by the district court's deadlines. See
TR 2842-2848. Therefore if the burden of proof had been placed upon the Appellee
during contempt proceedings, in this case, she would not have met her burden of proof.
Appellant asserts that given the criminal nature of contempt proceedings that this
Court should overturn the district court's Contempt Hearing Decision Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order. See id.

11
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(

A.

The Courts Do Not Have the Responsibility to Collect Litigants' Judgments
In this case the Appellee also asks this court to infer that since Mr. Merena has,

{

"Employ[ed] an army of attorneys to represent him," see Appellee Brief at pg. 3, and that
since, "Not coincidentally, Merena is represented by the same counsel in [a second

{

defamation] case as is currently representing him in this appeal," See id. at 13-14, that Mr.
Merena could have paid the imposed sanctions and that his arguments should be
i

disregarded. See id.
There is no case nor statutory law that supports this argument and allows such an
inference to be drawn, nor does the law indicate that this court may draw any adverse

(

inference from the fact that a party has representation. Moreover, there is no law that
would allow an adverse inference to be drawn if a litigant chooses to use his own
i

resources, if any, or the aid of others, to retain legal counsel instead of paying a judgment.
To the contrary, under Utah law the judgment creditor has the burden to collect monetary
judgments.
Mr. Merena had and has the right to representation. That fact is irrelevant to any
issue that was before the trial court or is currently before this Court. The fact remains that

(

the Appellee has never provided any evidence-other than the foregoing allegations-that
Mr. Merena had the ability to pay the district court's sanctions. Furthermore, Appellee has
also not availed herself of the appropriate collection mechanisms under Utah law.
Contrarily, after the district court entered $4,248.85 in monetary sanctions against
<
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Mr. Merena and after it dismissed his case, the Appellee used the district court as a debt
collector to enter an additional $5,589.15 in monetary sanctions, issue a $20,700 bench
warrant, and impose a 60 day term of incarceration against Mr. Merena for not "timely"
paying previous sanctions by deadlines set by the district court. See TR 2842-2851.
In 2010 in the state of Utah, 79 percent of judgments remained unsatisfied;
representing more than $31.6 million in court judgments. See addendum D; L. Prichard et
al., 79% of Utahns with Court-Ordered Debt Don't Pay, Investigation Shows, (October
25, 2010), http://www.deseretnews.eom/m/article/700076359. That leaves a very small
portion-21 percent of judgments representing about $2.25 million-that were fully paid.
See id. Why should the courts treat the Appellee different from any other judgment
creditor when damage awards remain unsatisfied? Should more penalties, fines, warrants,
be assessed in all Utah cases when judgments go unpaid?
Here, in fact by reacting in this manner, the district court became a partisan and
discarded its role as a neutral adjudicator when it imposed additional sanctions against
Mr. Merena for not contemporaneously paying sanctions. Until the courts are willing to
take on the heavy lifting of all judgment creditors, it was misplaced for the district court
to selectively do so in this case and enter additional sanctions upon Mr. Merena solely for
non-payment of the monetary awards and not due to any additional misbehavior.
The Court should therefore overturn the May 25, 2010, and August 25, 2010,
orders granting the additional sanctions.

13
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<

CONCLUSION
Mr. Merena respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals vacate the trial court's
dismissal of his case, remand it for trial, overturn the additional sanctions issued at the
August 18, 2010, OSC hearings, and alter the law to give litigants in civil contempt
proceedings the rights afforded criminal defendants, including the right against selfincrimination and the imposition of the burden of proof on the moving party.
DATED this j r £ day of December, 2011.
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS GROUP, PC
/

/?-'Z^^/'

/^HgeP!^,

ivid S. Head/Loren M. Lambert
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December ^ > . 2011, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing document were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
William P. Morrison, Esq.
Morrison & Morrison
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
willmorrison01@gmail.com

--

"^

y

i
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Wierzbicki v. Heart, 2010 UT App 146, 20100319-CA (UTCA)
2010 UTApp 146
Michele Wierzbicki, Plaintiff and Appellee,
/'

v.
Andrea Heart, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20100319-CA
Court of Appeal of Utah
June 4, 2010
Not For Official Publication
Third District, West Jordan Department, 090420028 The Honorable Terry L.
Christiansen
Andrea Heart, West Jordan, Appellant Pro Se
James A. Mclntyre and Sarah E. Viola, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges McHugh, Thome, and Voros.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Andrea Heart appeals the district court's order entered on April 1, 2010. This matter
is before the court on a motion for summary disposition. We dismiss the appeal without
prejudice.
Generally, "[a]n appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is
not final." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, U 9, 5 P.3d 649. Indeed, this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless it is taken from a final, appealable order. See id.
% 8. For an order to be a final, appealable order, the order must "dispose of all parties or
claims to an action." Id. <| 10. Where further action is contemplated by the express
language of the order, the order is not a final, appealable order. See State v. Leatherbury,
2003 UT 2, Tf 9, 65 P.3d 1180. The district court must also determine the amount of
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reasonable attorney fees, if any, before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an
appeal. See Promax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 15, 998 P.2d 254.
The district court's April 1, 2010 order expressly contemplates a further order of the
court regarding the proceeds derived from the sale of the parties1 real property. The order
also fails to resolve the remaining issue of attorney fees. Thus, the April 1, 2010 order is
not a final order for purposes of appeal. See id.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a timely
appeal from a final order.
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State v. Adams, 2011 UT App 163, 20090793-CA (UTCA)
2011 UTApp 163
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Verbery Adams, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20090793-CA
Court of Appeal of Utah
May 19,2011
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 081907684 The Honorable William W.
Barrett
Sherry Valdez and David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before McHugh, Thorne, and Roth, Judges.
OPINION
Stephen L. Roth, Judge
f 1 Verbery Adams appeals his conviction following a bench trial for attempted
murder, a first degree felony. Adams contends that the trial court erroneously admitted
into evidence a fourteen-year-old conviction for murder in violation of Utah Rule of
Evidence 404(b)fs notice and noncharacter purpose requirements. See Utah R. Evid.
404(b). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
f2 On October 4, 2008, Adams attended a party at an apartment complex where he
and Allan Saena got into a fight. Allan, who was very intoxicated, punched Adams
because Adams was talking to "one of [Allan's] girls." Others joined the brawl until
approximately five men were engaged in beating Adams. Eventually, the fight broke up
and Adams ran to his car, an SUV. As Adams was driving past the apartment building,
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Allan's cousin, Gary Saena, and Gary's fiancee, Jennifer Tafi, walked across the street.
Adams hit Gary with his vehicle, clipping his left hip and causing him to roll over the
hood of the car. Gary managed to land on his feet, and he and a couple others chased
Adams on foot. Allan, who had witnessed Adams hit his cousin, ran in front of Adams's
car and began pounding the hood in an effort to make Adams stop. Instead, Adams drove
over Allan with the car.
f3 Gary ran to Allan and lifted his head and upper body off the street. Adams
circled the building and drove by the party again a "minute or two" later for the purpose,
according to him, of picking up his girlfriend who had been left behind. When Gary heard
Tafi screaming, however, he looked up to see Adams's car coming at him and Allan at
approximately thirty to forty miles per hour. Gary then tried to "drag[ Allan] out of the
way so he wouldn't get hit, but th[e c a r ] . . . caught [Allan's] legs a second time," driving
over them at about the knees.
^[4 A security officer for the apartment complex was driving behind Adams when he
came around the building for a second time. He testified that he did not witness Adams's
vehicle strike anyone nor did he see anyone lying in the road. Adams continued driving
but stopped some distance past the group that had gathered around Allan. The security
officer parked his car in front of Adams's and got out to speak with him. When Adams
reported that he had been assaulted, the security officer instructed him to wait in his car
while the security officer went back to speak with other witnesses. After the security7
officer departed, Adams left the scene in his vehicle. The other witnesses told the security
officer that Adams had struck Allan with his car, and at that point, the security officer
observed an injured male lying in the grass. Allan was treated at the hospital for injuries
consistent with his being run over by a vehicle at least once and not inconsistent with
being struck twice. His most severe injuries included a broken pelvis, a broken right
femur, several fractures to the vertebrae, two broken ribs, a broken left collarbone, and a
lung contusion. Allan was released from the hospital in a wheelchair two-and-a-half
weeks later. He spent three months in the wheelchair and another two months using a
walker.
«|5 Adams was charged with two counts of attempted murder: a first degree felony
charge for intentionally or knowingly attempting to kill Allan, see Utah Code Ann. §
76-4-101(1) (2008) (setting forth the elements of attempt); id. § 76-5-203(2)(a) (Supp.
2010) (listing elements of first degree murder as intentionally or knowingly causing the
death of another); id. § 76-4-102(l)(c)(i) (2008) (classifying attempted murder under
sections 76-4-101(1) and 76-5-203(2)(a) as a first degree felony), and a second degree
felony charge for his actions against Gary, see id. § 76-4-101(1) (setting forth the
elements of attempt); id. § 76-5-203(2)(b) (defining as murder the commission of "an act
clearly dangerous to human life," with the intent to cause serious bodily injury, that
causes the death of another); id. §§ 76-4-102(l)(b)-(c), 76-5-203(a) (classifying attempted
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murder under sections 76-4-101(1) and 76-5-203(2)(b) as a second degree felony).
f 6 Approximately five months before trial, the State notified defense counsel that it
intended to "introduce [Adams]fs 1995 Murder conviction [for killing someone with his
vehicle] in the State of Illinois ... to establish knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake
or accident in the event that [Adams] testifie[d] at the trial and put[] his knowledge or
intent at issue." On the morning of the bench trial, the State moved to admit a certified
copy of Adams's conviction under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Over the
defense's objection, the trial court determined that the conviction was admissible,
observing that if the case were before a jury, the court "probably wouldn't allow it" but
that admission "would [not] be prejudicial in terms of [the court] being the [factfinder] in
this case." The court then cautioned the parties that it was concerned with "what
transpired on October 4, 2008, " not fourteen years earlier.
f 7 During trial, an investigating officer testified that in the course of an interview
with Adams following the October 4 incident, Adams had mentioned an incident in
Chicago in 1995 in which he had hit a person with his vehicle. Defense counsel objected
to this testimony, arguing that it was "hearsay" and that "the State has other methods of
introducing this." At that point, the State offered a certified copy of a statement of
conviction for murder in Illinois in 1995; the court overruled Adams's objection to the
officer's testimony, stating that it had "already told [the prosecutor] that [it] w[ould]
allow" the conviction in evidence. The defense raised no objection to the certified copy of
the statement of conviction itself, either as to its admissibility in general or as to the fact
that the State had offered it in its case-in-chief rather than, as its notice had stated, in
rebuttal in the event that Adams testified and raised the issue of his intent. The court
admitted the statement of conviction "to the extent it may or may not be helpful." Once
the 1995 conviction was admitted, the State indicated, "[W]e're not going to talk about
that Chicago incident, " and did not question the officer further regarding the conviction.
The only other mention of the prior conviction occurred during the State's closing
argument when the prosecutor stated that, based on the circumstances of this case and his
prior conviction for murder with a vehicle, a "car is just [Adams's] preferred weapon."
18 In a detailed ruling from the bench, the trial court convicted Adams of first
degree attempted murder but acquitted him of the second degree attempted murder
charge. The court did not mention the prior conviction in its ruling. Adams now appeals
the trial court's decision to admit the fourteen-year-old conviction for murder in Illinois.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
19 Adams contends that the trial court erred in admitting the prior conviction both
because the State failed to give reasonable notice of its intent to introduce bad acts
evidence and because it was presented to show propensity rather than for a noncharacter
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purpose. See generally Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing prior convictions to be admitted
for noncharacter purposes provided that the State give the defense notice of its intention
to introduce such evidence). We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings under rule
404(b) for abuse of discretion. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^[16, 6 P.3d
1120. "We will reverse an erroneous evidentiary ruling only if, absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a more favorable result for the
defendant." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^[17, 999 P.2d 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
TflO While Adams preserved his contention that the conviction should not have been
admitted at all by his opposition to the State's motion in limine, Adams did not object to
the timing of its introduction, either during the motion in limine or at trial. [l]Specifically,
Adams did not object that the State had offered the conviction during its case-in-chief,
contrary to its notice, which stated that the State would introduce prior bad acts evidence
only if Adams "testifies at the trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue."
Consequently, Adams has failed to preserve the timing issue for appeal, see State v. Low,
2008 UT 58, ^fl7, 192 P.3d 867 (stating that preservation requires a party to raise an issue
to the trial court's attention so that the court has an opportunity to rule on it), and we will
consider it under the plain error doctrine, see id. ^j 19 (recognizing plain error as an
exception to the preservation requirement). "To prevail under plain error review, a
defendant must demonstrate that [1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." Id. ^f 20 (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Adams Was Not Prejudiced by the Admission of His Prior Conviction.
^11 On appeal, Adams has raised serious issues about the admissibility of the
fourteen-year-old prior conviction. We do not address that issue here, however, because
any error in admissibility was harmless.[2] Consequently, we affirm the conviction.
A. Judges, Sitting as Finders of Fact in Bench Trials, Are Presumed To Be Less
Likely than a Jury To Be Prejudiced by Evidence of Prior Crimes.
^[12 This case was tried not to a jury, but to the court. Although the nature of the
proceedings should not affect the admissibility of evidence, we recognize a presumption
that the court considers only admissible evidence and disregards any inadmissible
evidence. See State v. Burke, 102 Utah 249, 129 P.2d 560, 562 (1942); see also People v.
Naylor, 893 N.E.2d 653, 665 (111. 2008) (presuming that courts consider prior
convictions "only with respect to the purpose for which [they were] competent" (internal
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quotation marks omitted)). As a corollary to this general principal, judges in bench trials
are presumed to be less likely than juries to be prejudiced by prior bad acts evidence, such
as the prior conviction at issue in this case.
[T]he judge in a bench trial, as in this case, acting as a trier of fact, is presumably less
likely than a jury to be prejudiced by evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts ....
n
[B]ecause it can be safely assumed that the trial court will be somewhat more
discriminating in appraising both the competency and the effect properly to be given
evidence, the rulings on evidence are looked upon with a greater degree of indulgence
when the trial is to the court than when it is to the jury.1'
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90,
404 P.2d 677, 679 (1965)); see also State v. 633 E. 640 N., 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah
1997) (stating that the risk of unfair prejudice from wrongly admitted evidence is
"primarily of concern during a jury trial"). The trial judge, in fact, seemed to have had just
this presumption in mind when he alluded to the fact that he would not have admitted the
prior conviction in a jury trial but that its admission "would [not] be prejudicial in terms
of [the court] being the [factfinder] in this case." And with this presumption in mind, we
now consider whether there is "a reasonable likelihood that [in the absence of any error in
admission, ] there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Kohl,
2000 UT 35, f 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Adams Has Failed To Demonstrate that the Trial Court's Verdict Likely Would
Have Been Different but for the Admission of the Prior Conviction.
|13 Adams acknowledges the presumption that trial judges recognize the
responsibility and have the commensurate ability to appropriately weigh and consider
evidence—even evidence that should not have been admitted—as a general tenet but
argues that, in this case, the presumption is unwarranted. In particular, Adams contends
that the trial court's admission of the evidence "demonstrates that the prior conviction was
considered in Adams'[s] guilt determination."
f 14 To support his contention, Adams relies on the Illinois decision in People v.
Naylor, 893 N.E.2d 653 (111. 2008), and the Massachusetts decision in Commonwealth v.
Darby, 642 N.E.2d 303 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). Both cases recognize the general
presumption that a trial judge, sitting as the finder of fact, considers the evidence for its
proper worth. See Naylor, 893 N.E.2d at 665; Darby, 642 N.E.2d at 306-07. In each,
however, the reviewing court determined that the presumption had been rebutted because
the inadmissible evidence actually factored into the trial court's determination of the
defendant's guilt. See Naylor, 893 N.E.2d at 666-67; Darby, 642 N.E.2d at 306. Although
we agree that Naylor and Darby set forth the law appropriately, the facts of this case make
those decisions less helpful to Adams's position.
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Tfl5 In Naylor, the Illinois Supreme Court observed that f,[w]here an objection has
been made to the evidence and overruled, it cannot be presumed that the evidence did not
enter into the court's consideration. The ruling itself indicates that the court thought the
evidence proper." 893 N.E.2d at 666. Because the trial court admitted inadmissible
evidence, the Naylor court reversed the defendant's conviction. See id. at 667. Adams
argues we must take the same approach here. Although we do not disagree with the
principle set forth in Naylor, the court's language must be understood in context. There,
the government moved to admit a prior conviction for aggravated battery that occurred in
December 1990 for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. See id. at 658.
The defense objected, citing the state's ten-year limit on admitting prior convictions for
impeachment purposes. See id. The trial court overruled the objection and received the
conviction in evidence. See id. at 658, 666. The Illinois Supreme Court decided that the
trial court had misapplied the ten-year rule and that the conviction had therefore been
wrongly admitted. See id. at 656, 665-67. The supreme court recognized the presumption
that a trial judge, sitting without a jury, disregards evidence that is not properly
admissible. See id. at 665 ("As a matter of law, we must presume that the trial court
considered defendant's prior conviction only with respect to the purpose for which it was
competent." (internal quotation marks omitted)). But the trial court's ruling that the prior
conviction was admissible on the basis that it believed the conviction was obtained within
ten years of the offense "indicate[d] that the court thought the evidence proper." Id. at
666. Thus, the supreme court had considerable doubt that the trial court disregarded the
earlier conviction when judging the defendant's credibility. See id. at 666-67. As a result,
it concluded that the defendant had successfully rebutted the presumption that the court
only considers competent evidence and reversed the defendant's conviction. See id. at
665-67.
^[16 In the Massachusetts Appeals Court's decision in Darby, the trial court had
erroneously admitted highly prejudicial and irrelevant photographs in a bench trial. See
642 N.E.2d at 304-05. The court of appeals reversed. See id. at 307. In so doing, the court
recognized the standard presumption regarding the ability of trial judges to deal
appropriately with inadmissible evidence, noting that "where the fact finder is a judge, not
a jury,... [a] departure from usual procedure is not likely to be prejudicial." See id. at 306
(omission and alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, it
recognized that while a "judge, sitting without a jury, in ruling upon the admissibility of
evidence, will at times hear or see matters that would be excluded from a jury's
consideration," review of that inadmissible evidence is not necessarily prejudicial. See id.
at 306. The court, however, distinguished the situation where the "judge has not indicated
whether he or she has considered improperly admitted evidence":
The judge's review of ultimately inadmissible evidence would not be prejudicial error
where the judge stated that he or she either was not affected by the evidence or did not
consider it. Where a judge has not indicated whether he or she has considered improperly
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admitted evidence, we can only speculate upon the effect of that evidence. When we are
not in a position to say that it had none . . . such doubts as we entertain can only be
resolved in favor of the defendant.
Id. (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Darby court
reversed the defendant's conviction because the evidence of the defendant's guilt was "not
overwhelming" and because the trial court had determined that "the photographs had
'some probative value'" but did not indicate what weight it actually gave to the
photographs in convicting the defendant. See id.
^[17 The present case is distinguishable from both Naylor and Darby because in each
of those cases, the trial court admitted the evidence without reservation, while the trial
court here indicated on the record that, from the beginning, it gave little weight to the
prior conviction. In considering the State's request for admission of Adams's prior
conviction, the trial court recognized the potentially prejudicial impact the prior
conviction may have had on a jury, but it did not think "it would be prejudicial in terms of
[the court] being the [factfinder] in this case." The court assured the parties, however, that
its "real concern during the course of this trial is what transpired on October 4, 2008," the
date of the charged offense. When it actually admitted the statement of the prior
conviction a relatively short time later, the trial court stated that the conviction would be
admitted "to the extent it may or may not be helpful." Such an equivocal, even dismissive,
statement at the time of admission appears to support the implication from the court's
statements in ruling on the motion in limine that it considered the conviction to be of little
moment. See generally State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989) (presuming
that trial judges afford evidence only the weight and effect it deserves); Naylor, 893
N.E.2d at 665 (same).
Tfl8 This conclusion finds significant additional support in the court's detailed ruling
from the bench explaining its decision to convict Adams, where it evaluated the
credibility of the witnesses, reconciled conflicting evidence, and set out the basis for its
decision to convict on a single count of attempted murder. The court stated that it found
Tafi's testimony that Allan had been struck twice to be very credible and that Gary's
testimony corroborated Tafi's. The court also explained how it reconciled the
inconsistencies between their testimonies and the security officer's, primarily by
suggesting the security officer was not as close to Adams as he remembered being and
that the court was unclear as to precisely when the security officer began following
Adams. Finally, the court explained why it was convinced that Adams had the intent to
kill Allan when he struck him a second time. It recognized that Adams "was probably
angry" at being assaulted, but the court thought it was telling that Adams chose to flee
rather than to cooperate with the security officer, concluding that Adams's own innocent
explanation for having left the area was not credible. The court also found incredible
Adams's explanation that he circled the building a second time to pick up his girlfriend,
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rather than just leaving the complex, and concluded that his actions were strong evidence
of his criminal intent.[3] Nowhere in its detailed ruling did the trial court mention the
prior conviction, and we see nothing in its statements explaining the ruling that suggests
that the court allowed the prior conviction to affect its decision. To the contrary, the
court's ruling focused solely on the events of the night in question, reinforcing a
conclusion that, throughout the trial, the court remained focused on "what transpired on
October 4, 2008," not fourteen years earlier.
«[f 19 Further, the court acquitted Adams of attempted murder on the second count for
his actions against Gary. Because there was some evidence to support a conviction on this
count, the fact that the court did not convict Adams on this charge lends further support to
our conclusion that the prior conviction did not influence the verdict. Cf. Commonwealth
v. Darby, 642 N.E.2d 303, 306 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (placing no weight on the fact
that the court also acquitted the defendant on two counts where "there was no evidence
whatsoever as to those [counts]" (emphases added)).
^|20 Because the record indicates that the trial court was not improperly influenced
by Adams's prior conviction, we conclude that there is little likelihood of a different
verdict had the evidence not been admitted and any error in its admission was therefore
harmless.
II. Adams Has Not Established that the Court Plainly Erred in Allowing the Prior
Conviction To Be Admitted in the State's Case-in-Chief.
^[21 Adams also contends that he was prejudiced because the prior conviction was
admitted in violation of the State's rule 404(b) notice, which indicated that the State
would introduce the prior conviction only if Adams testified and put intent or knowledge
at issue. Because this issue was not preserved below, we review it for plain error.
^|22 To succeed on a claim of plain error, a defendant must show that there was an
error, that it was obvious, and that it was prejudicial. See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ^f 20,
192 P.3d 867. Because we conclude that any error that may have occurred was not
harmful, we do not address whether an error occurred that should have been obvious to
the trial court.
A. Adams Has Failed to Establish Any Prejudice.
«|23 Adams claims that his defense was prejudiced as a result of the State's failure to
provide notice that it intended to introduce the prior conviction in its case-in-chief.
Specifically, he asserts that he was surprised by the introduction of the prior conviction as
part of the State's case and that he otherwise "would have had a chance to prepare to
distinguish the facts of the prior conviction from the facts of the present case." While
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Adams indicates that this would have included preparing testimony of other witnesses or
preparing to testify on his own behalf, he does not provide any details about what that
testimony would have been or how it would have impacted the trial. Cf. State v.
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (observing, in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, that neither the record nor the appellate brief suggested that
the defendant would have testified in the absence of the attorney's error or indicated what
that testimony would show, and holding that an "invitation to speculate" about the impact
of unspecified testimony "cannot substitute for proof of prejudice"). Nor does Adams
identify any other material change in his trial preparation, presentation, or strategy that
may have resulted. In addition, we observe that while the defense raised an objection to
the State's mode of introducing the conviction, it did not express any concerns about its
timing, much less request a continuance or a mistrial. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,
919 & n.6 (Utah 1987) (attributing significance to the fact that the defendant requested,
and was denied, both a continuance and a mistrial when the state failed to provide the
defense with inculpatory statements). Moreover, we have already concluded that
admission of the prior conviction was not substantively prejudicial. Under the
circumstances, Adams has failed to show that he was harmed by the timing of the
introduction of evidence of the prior conviction.
B. The Burden in Plain Error Review Remains with Adams.
Tf24 Finally, Adams asserts that the error in notice is of such a nature that the burden
should shift to the State to show that the error was harmless. As support for this
contention, Adams relies on our supreme court's decisions in State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913 (Utah 1987), a case in which the state failed to provide the defense with inculpatory
statements made by key witnesses, see id. at 916, and State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah
1988), a case in which the state failed to provide adequate notice of the charges, see id. at
102. In those cases, the supreme court shifted the burden to the prosecution because (1)
the record was of little assistance in discovering the magnitude of the prejudice to the
defense or in understanding how defense counsel might have prepared differently for the
case if it had adequate knowledge and (2) the defense had put on credible evidence that
the errors did, in fact, impair the defense. See Bell, 770 P.2d at 106-07; Knight, 734 P.2d
at 920-21. The issues in those cases, however, had been preserved for appeal. Here, we
are reviewing the timing of the introduction of the prior conviction for plain error. The
burden of establishing plain error is on the party asserting it. See Low, 2008 UT 58, f 20.
Nothing that Adams has pointed to in Knight or Bell supports a change in that burden
where plain error is at issue, and Adams has not otherwise persuaded us that such a
change is warranted under the circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
^25 Adams has failed to demonstrate that any error in the admission of his prior
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murder conviction during the prosecution's case resulted in prejudice to his defense. As a
result, we affirm the conviction for first degree attempted murder.
I

1f26 WE CONCUR: Carolyn B. McHugh, Associate Presiding Judge William A.
Thome Jr., Judge

Notes:
[l]The defense did not announce that Adams would not testify until the close of the
State's evidence. Therefore, we presume that at the time the rule 404(b) motion was
argued, the defense was still under the assumption that the prior conviction evidence
would only be offered if Adams testified and put knowledge or intent at issue, as
indicated by the State's notice. When the State introduced the evidence in its case-in-chief
prior to its knowing whether Adams would testify or what his testimony would be,
defense counsel had an obligation to raise that issue to the trial court's attention in order
to preserve it for appeal. See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ^ 17, 192 P.3d 867 (requiring a
party to "bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention" by making "a timely and
specific objection ... [at trial]" so that "the court [has] an opportunity to correct the errors"
in order to preserve an issue for appeal (first alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
[2] We are skeptical regarding the admissibility of the prior conviction, however, for a
number of reasons, including its age and its apparent goal of establishing propensity
rather than intent. As Adams points out, nothing about the known details of his prior
murder conviction appear to bear directly on his intent in this case. Instead, a factfinder
would have to infer that because Adams had engaged in an altercation, then fled in his
car, intentionally striking and killing a person in the process fourteen years ago, he must
have had that same intent when he struck Allan. The necessary inferential path from the
prior conviction to Adams's intent at the time of the charged crime strongly suggests that
the purpose of the evidence was to show Adams's propensity to run over people when
threatened rather than to establish that he had the specific intent to kill on a particular
occasion fourteen years later. As one law professor has explained,
The conclusion that the defendant intended to commit this particular crime is the end
product of a chain of inferences. It proceeds from the given proposition that the defendant
at another place and time committed a crime similar to, but unconnected with, the present
crime. From the proven fact—the "prior"—we are asked to infer that on a specific day
and time this defendant had the specific intent to participate in the crime charged. The
conclusion and its factual basis are widely separated. The gap can be bridged only by
supplying an inference that the defendant has a tendency (that is, a propensity) to commit
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this kind of crime. It is this inference that is not permissible.
Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b),
608(b) and 609(a), 38 Emory L J. 135, 158 (Winter 1989) (citing United States v. Powell,
587 F.2d 443, 447-49 (9th Cir. 1978)). Even the prosecutor's closing argument statement
in reference to the prior conviction—that a "car is just [Adams's] preferred
weapon"—suggests propensity much more strongly than intent (or modus operandi,
another proper noncharacter purpose). The trial judge's concern about the admissibility of
this evidence was therefore well founded.
[3]In opening statements, defense counsel seemed to concede that if the court believed
that Adams ran over Allan twice, there was evidence of intent.
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cfterant W« P* Morrisan

"•
:
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'f < in< < ^

/
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MMBXsm & mmmsm, &.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
Alice KL Msrena
352 East 900 South
/^Salt Lake City* Utah 84111
telephone: {8011 359-7999
w
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774
IN- THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN MID FOR SALT IAKE CGOMTY, STATE OF UTftH
—oOo
ALICE; M, MERENA,
Petitioner^
vs..

;
:
:>

VERIFIED PETITION
FOR DIVORCE

:;•

ICESSBfH M*L£H MERENA,

r

Civil No. 0^14^OSIMU

Respondent.

r
:

Judge: Hcdley
Commi ss ione r* £TVdn5

0

COMES NOW the Petitioner Mice M, Mereri.a, and through her
attorney Grant W. P* Morrison, and being first duly sworn upon her
oatl% ooiBplaiHS against the Respondent as follows:
1«

Jurisdiction and. Grounds, Petitioner and Respondent are

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have- been such
for mora than three (3) months prior to the filing of this action
and therefore, venue is proper,
2.

The Petitioner and Respondent &r& husband and wife,

having been married on June 11, 2006 in the City of Price, State of
Utah,
i
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3.

During the course of the marriage the parties ha^e had

irreconcilable differences entitling the Petitioner to a Decree of
Divorce to hecowie final upon entry by the Court.

in particular,

the Petitioner and the Respondent have arguments, that are not
resolveable and the parties have attempted counseling, which has
been unsuccessful.

The parties cannot resolve their differences

short of divorce.
4 . Children, Custody, Parent Tima and ChiJUi Support,

During

the course of the marriage the parties have had born as their issue
no children and none are expected.
5.

There has teeen a Protective Order issued, which is case

no. 074903538CA which should be incorporated into the divorce,
6.

.Medical and Itental Insurance*

The Respondent should be

ordered to maintain a policy of health, accident and dental
insurance for and on behalf of the Petitioner during the pendency
of this action.

When the divorce is concluded each party should

maintain their own insurance.
"?«

Alimony,

The Respondent should pay the Petitioner a

reasonable ^bridge* alimony.
8* Division of Personal Property^ The parties have acquired
various items of personal property which should be divided fairly
and equitably.
9.

Division of Real Property^ The parties drd not acquire

any real property but the Petitioner claims an interest in the
appreciated value of the Respondent's pre-marital house,
10. Hetiremant. Neither party acquired any retirement during
2
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the marriage.
11-

Bsfajfeg* The parties have acquired debts during the

marriage and the Respondent should be ordered to pay the entirety
of the debts acquired the parties during the marriage.

Further,

the expenses incurred by the Petitioner as a result of her hatriog
to relocate to an extended lining facility, should be paid in.
their entirety by the Respondent, as well as any and all costs
relating to the repair procedure to correct the Petitioner's right
e y e •..

12,

Keterii of Prior Wmm.

prior name of
13*

the Petitioner should have her

DHFIS,

m^mrnm'B

Fees,

The Respondent

should

pay

the

Petitioner's attorney''© fees,
14.

Each party' should be ordered to execute any and all

documents relative to the.effectuation of this Divorce Complaint.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays this Court for the following:
I*-

For a; Decree of Divorce consistent with this Petition»

2.*> \ For such other and further relief as the Court deems
necessary and proper in the premises.
DATED this 20th day of August, 2007.

fydfl^

Grant W, P* Morrison
Attorney for P e t i t i o n e r

3
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Alice Michelle Mexana.
Petitioner

STATE OF UTAH
:S$.<

County of Salt Lake)
On the 20th day of August, 2007, personally appeared before me
Alice Michelle Merena, the signer of the foregoing Verified
Petition who duly acknowledged to me that she signed the same
voluntarily and the contents are true to the best of her knowledge,
information and belief.

L

mthm

mmmf

J^t^
"Sbtary Public

'j&timwiWNm
« $a»t jL4k* $ & UteflMMt 11
•Nfc^mmtitfcfc &c$r**
Notromfw m 2007

.•••^STATtoy.ifrAa./J

4
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79% of Utahns with court-ordered debt don't pay, investigation shows
By Lori Prichard and Linda Williams KSL 5 News
Published: Monday, Oct. 25 2010 10:44 p.m. MDT
SALT LAKE CITY — Thousands of Utahns have been fighting for months — and in
many cases years — to get back millions of dollars that rightfully belong to them. The
courts have issued hundreds of thousands of judgments — ordering people to pay back
their debts.
But in a yearlong investigation, KSL 5 News uncovered a system that does little to force
the debtor to pay and offers no guarantee of justice.
Judgments
'The judge said, yep — I mean it was clear. Here's the note. He didn't pay you. OK. He
owes you the money,ff says Regan Fackrell, a Salt Lake County resident awarded a
judgment for $100,000 in 2009.
"I was awarded a judgment of several thousand dollars," says Steve Short, a local
business owner. "I was elated."
Like thousands of Utahns, Fackrell and Short won their cases and received judgments
from the court. Judgments are awarded at the end of a civil court or small claims case.
They order people who owe money to pay that money back, but more often than not —
they don't.
"It's been two years. I haven't seen a dime," Short said.
"I will never get my money back," said Fackrell.
"It's just a piece of paper," said Brenda Simko, a Utah County resident familiar with the
collections process. "It doesn't have any power. It doesn't give me back the money that I
am out."
The Administrative Office of the Courts, attorneys and professional collections agents say
they've seen an increase in the number of people obtaining judgments over the past two
years, largely due to the bad economy. At the same time, they've seen an increase in the
number of people who are unable or unwilling to pay what they owe.
"People have started to learn that it's OK if they don't pay their bills," says David Saxton,
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owner of Salt Lake collections firm North American Recovery.
Saxton said his clients are suffering as a result of bad debt. He said in the past, unpaid
debt accounted for 3 percent to 8 percent of a company's overall business. Now, debt
accounts for 18 percent to 20 percent of his clients' business.
"It's affecting clients," Saxton said. "It's affecting their cash flow in a seriously negative
way."
How many pay?
With so many Utahns seeking justice, KSL 5 News set out to measure the effectiveness of
the system. Over the course of a year, we examined more than 5,000 civil court and small
claims cases to see how many people actually got paid after the court said they won. We
found an overwhelming majority of the people are still waiting for their money.
KSL reviewed 5,143 cases from seven district courts — big and small. Of those cases, 14
percent or 741 judgments were either dismissed, withdrawn or set aside. That left 4,402
judgments still open for collections. Seventy-nine percent of those cases remain
unsatisfied — the winners still waiting for more than $31.6 million. Compare that to just
21 percent, or $2.25 million that have been paid in full.
"There are a good number ofjudgments that remain unpaid," says Tim Shea, staff
attorney for the Administrative Office of the Courts. "It's largely because the most that the
court can offer the creditor is a process."
The process
The collections process begins after the judgment is awarded. However, it only begins if
the person who won the judgment — the creditor — chooses to go after his or her money.
"The creditor has to take steps to protect their interests," said Shea. "The court, again,
offers tools to help do that but can't do it on their behalf."
Those tools include: 1) writs of garnishment, 2) writs of execution, 3) supplemental
orders and 4) property liens.
On your own
Utah County landlords Brenda and Dan Simko know how difficult the collection process
18
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can be. For the past 20 years, they've spent hundreds of hours chasing down money from
tenants who don't pay their rent.
"It's frustrating because you feel like you're really on your own," Brenda Simko said.
"You can get a judgment, but how are you going to collect?" added Dan Simko.
Like a growing number of Utahns, the Simkos have chosen to go through the legal
process on their own without the help of an attorney. Brenda Simko is a stay-at-home
mother of seven, but spends her free time teaching herself the legal process. She surfs the
court's website, translates the legalese into English and takes the process step-by-step.
The Simkos say they've had some success collecting because of Brenda's perseverance
and attention to detail and deadlines. But they say they probably wouldn't have had much
luck if she worked outside the home.
"If I went to another place of employment, the courthouse is only open during the same
hours that I would be at work. It would be really, really tough," she said.
And expensive. The creditor must pay all costs up front — to file paperwork, to have
legal notices served, to pay attorney's fees. Saxton said it has gotten so bad that his
collections firm doesn't even pursue smaller amounts of money any more because the
chances of collecting are too small and the costs of collecting too high.
"By the time you get to a garnishment you can easily have spent anywhere from $200 to
$500," Saxton said.
North American Recovery has spent 18 years collecting money for clients. It has its own
legal team that goes after debt and every month its lawyers obtain roughly 600 judgments.
Saxton said without them, it would be nearly impossible to collect.
"It would be overwhelming," he said. "If somebody doesn't know how to do that, doesn't
know all the hoops they have to jump through, I cannot imagine them being able to have
any success collecting a judgment at all."
Attorney Richard Terry agrees. He represents banks, businesses and everyday people
during the judgment and collection process. He said the average person could figure out
how to do it on their own, but it would be very difficult. Still, he admits, even if someone
does hire an attorney, they may never see results.
"It's certainly easier for us because we know exactly how to do it. We know all the tricks.
19
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We know how to get around a lot of the tricks, but you still have that same fundamental
problem;' Terry said. "The old saying goes, 'You can't squeeze blood out of a turnip.' And
so if there's no blood there, even the attorney can't get it."
No $, no resolution
Debtors elude payment in a number of ways. Oftentimes they don't have a job — or quit
their job — so their wages can't be garnished. If they own property of any kind, they'll
transfer that property into someone else's name so it can't be seized or sold to pay off their
debt. And they'll skip — meaning they disappear and do what they can to keep from being
found. However, the most common way many avoid debt is by filing bankruptcy.
"If they file bankruptcy then they can eventually obtain a discharge, meaning they don't
have to pay the debt at all. It's gone," Terry said.
Regan Fackrell understands all too well how a bankruptcy can leave a creditor with no
recourse. Last year, he told KSL he was worried the person who owed him money would
use that tool to get out of paying his $100,000 judgment.
"A judgment would be wiped away with one bankruptcy," Fackrell explained.
Sure enough, a year later, that person filed bankruptcy. Now Fackrell's only option is to
start the process all over again — in federal bankruptcy court — because once someone
files bankruptcy, all state collection efforts stop.
No enforcement
Shea agrees the process offered by the court can be tough. The law that allows you to win
a judgment stops short of providing any muscle you might need to get paid on it. The
reason?
"The mere fact of non-payment is not a criminal act," he said.
No crime means an officer won't come to make an arrest, no jail time and no real penalty
to enforce the debtor to make payment. Shea said the state isn't going to spend more
money or hire more people to help chase down unpaid debts. It would cost the taxpayers
hundreds of thousands of dollars — if not more — and by acting as the collector, Shea
said the court would be unable to maintain its neutrality in the case.
"The process that we offer from the initial filing of the complaint to the last satisfaction
20
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of judgment has to be a fair process in which both parties are treated equally/1 he said.
f T
Tt s not always clear the creditor is in the right, and so the court is required to resolve
those disputes."
While the court canft collect on behalf of the creditors, Shea said it does offer them some
help — a book, a DVD and a class on how to collect on a judgment. Shea teaches the
class once a month. He says it was originally the tail end of a class on the small claims
process, but it took up so much time they had to create a separate course for it.
But even when creditors attend the class, many still find the process discouraging.
"It'd be easier to employ ... Dog the Bounty Hunter," remarked one creditor, causing the
classroom to erupt in laughter.
Credit impact
If debtors can elude payment and the courts provide no real method of enforcing payment,
what's the worst that can happen to someone who doesn't ante up? A ding on their credit.
Representatives from credit bureaus Experian, Equifax and Trans Union said the agencies
constantly pull court records in search of judgments. The judgment then appears on a
debtor's credit reports as a derogatory mark where it remains for seven years — even if
the debt is paid. But Saxton said the threat of bad credit doesn't really matter anymore.
"They can still go out and get a loan even if they have bad credit," he said. "So people just
are learning they don't have to pay."
Are judgments worth it?
No doubt, the odds are stacked high against people who fight for their money, so why do
so many bother? It depends on who you ask.
'"Cause I can't afford to house the world," said Brenda Simko.
"It's about principle," said Short. "It's all about being vindicated and asserting that I was
right about what I was trying to collect."
Regardless of the motivation, are judgments worth it in the end? That, too, depends on
who you ask.
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"Sometimes it's just best to walk away, we'll have to see," said Teresa Giles, a Utah
County resident just starting the collection process on a $40,000 judgment.
i

"You need to be able to have a way to collect your money," said Dan Simko. "There has
to be some accountability."
"I believe they are definitely worth it because people, otherwise, simply are not enforcing
their rights," Shea said.

i

"Will the judgment do anything for me?" asks Fackrell, as he throws his hands in the air
out of frustration.
Bottom line, judgments are difficult to collect and there's very little anyone can do to
force people to pay. A judgment expires after eight years, but if you feel it's worth it, you
can pay more money and have the judgment renewed.
Experts suggest creditors do everything they can on their own — follow court deadlines,
file the proper paperwork and make sure everything is correct. If, after all that, they still
can't get answers, they recommend creditors hire a professional to help them along.

<

But even then, there are still no guarantees.
e-mail: lprichard@ksl.com; lwilliams@ksl.com
http:/Avww.deseretnews.com/m/article/700076359

I

I

i
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